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BOOK REVIEWS

In summary, this is different from the books that have been produced before. It would be a worthwhile accomplishment even if no
course in creditors' remedies were offered in American law schools.
For course use, it is less a casebook than it is a do-it-yourself kit from
which a first class teaching tool can be assembled. The result is well
worth the effort.
RONAN E. DEGNAN*

SUr ME COURT ON TniL. By Charles S. Hyneman. New York:
Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. IX, 308. $6.50.

THE

Professor Hyneman's book represents still another entry in the current debate over the proper role of judicial review in a democratic
society.' Although he approaches this subject via an analysis of several
recent attacks upon the United States Supreme Court, Professor Hyneman essentially deals with the same topics-the legitimacy of judicial
review, the proper standards applicable to constitutional adjudication,
and the alleged departure of the school segregation cases 2 from those
standards-that have served as the subject of several books and at least
a score of articles published within the past five years.3 Indeed the
writing in this area has grown so voluminous that it is difficult for
anyone except a full-time student of constitutional law to read it all.
Accordingly, any evaluation of a new book in this area must take into
account the "competition." Judged in this light, The Supreme Court
on Trial, while a fairly interesting and possibly useful volume, hardly
ranks as "essential reading" for the lawyer who is interested in the
subject of judicial review. Professor Hyneman obviously has produced
to be of as little aid to the eye as possible. I doubt that Professor Countryman had
any choice about this.

*Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. A more complete description of this debate may be found in Shapiro, The Supreme

Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO.
WASir. L. REv. 587 (1963). In many respects, the current debate is merely the latest
chapter in a long standing controversy over the proper function of the Court. See, e.g.,
the literature cited in Sutherland, Book Review, 74 HAul. L. REV. 197 n.3 (1860). See
also BouniN, GoVRN mm

By JuDicIlRy (1932).

2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 484 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
3. See, e.g., BicxEL, THE LFAsT DANGEROUS BIANCH: THE SUPREmE CoURT AT THE
BAR OF PoLrrics (1962); BLAci, THE PEOPIE .A) TH CouRT: JUDIcIAL REVIMV IN A
DEmocRAcY (1960); MAsON, Tm SUPREmm CoimT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM (1962);
MENDELsON, JUsTIcES BLAcK AND FRANxs'RTm: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961);
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR
RosTow, THE SovEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SupREN
LAw (1962); WECEsLER, PmEcSim, PoLrrcs AND FUNDAMzNTAL LAW (1961).
Various law review articles are collected by Shapiro, supra note 1, at 587 n.1. See

also Wright, The Supreme Court cannot be Neutral, 40 TExAs L. Rmv. 599 n.2 (1962).
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a better work than several other authors dealing with the same topic, 4
but, in my opinion, his contribution still falls far short of the excellence of the best literature in this field.5
One favorable aspect of Professor Hyneman's book is that the several
sections into which it is divided, unlike the segments of some generally superior books,6 are tied together by something more than the
fact that they deal in some general way with the Supreme Court.
The forty chapters in The Supreme Court on Trial are divided into
five major sub-books, each of which builds progressively toward the
final conclusions offered in part five, titled "Judicial Power and Democratic Government."
In the first sub-book Professor Hyneman carefully examines recent criticisms leveled against the Supreme Court, concentrating primarily on the criticism which stemmed from the school segregation
cases. He describes in detail the various forms this criticism has taken
and notes that such criticism has ample precedent in similar attacks
which have been made in every significant period of the Court's history This leads him to conclude that the nation has not lived comfortably under dramatic demonstrations of judicial power 7 and that,
in part, this has been due to a "widespread suspicion" that the power
of judicial review was never intended by the founding fathers but
was usurped by the courts. 8
Whether there is any reasonable justification for suspicion is the
concern of the second sub-book. After examining the language
of the Constitution, the writings of the founding fathers, the reasoning
of Marbury v. Madison,9 and the arguments of commentators, Professor Hyneman finds that, "men who fear extensive judicial power may
reasonably cling to a conviction that a doctrine of judicial review was
not originally incorporated in the Constitution but was grafted onto
it by subsequent practice." 10
In part III the author considers another basic line of attack against
the Court, the frequently raised charge that it has "cross[ed] the
boundaries of judicial power and invad[ed] a realm intended exclusively for the political branches of government."" He finds that the
basis for such charges lies in the significant policy-making power
which is almost inevitably a part of constitutional interpretation. As
4. See e.g., BLOCH, STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAW OF ThE LAND (1958); Nichols, An
Appeal To Save Our Vritten Form of Government, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 15 (1963).
5. See, e.g., BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 3; BLAciC, op. cit. supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., ROSToW, op. cit. supra note 3; WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 3.
7. HynmmAN, THE SUPRMM COURT ON TuAL 31 (1963).
8. Id. at 84, 123.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 114.
11. Id. at 129.
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an illustration of the Court's past exercise of this power, Professor
Hyneman describes in detail the' shift in the judicial interpretation
of the due process and interstate commerce clauses during the nineteen thirties.
Turning from policy-making in the past to policy-making in the
present, Professor Hyneman presents in part IV the heart of his bookan analysis of the school segregation cases. Building upon the points
made in previous sections, the author concludes that the school segregation decision has carried judicial review, and consequently judicial
policy-making, to a "new peak of judicial power." 12 He stresses that,
unlike the significant cases of the past, such as the laissez-faire decisions of the thirties, the ruling in the segregation cases does not
merely confirm the status quo by preventing new reforms, but operates affirmatively to force a highly significant social change upon
society. Professor Hyneman apparently feels that the Court in this
decision has travelled farther into the "domain" of the legislature
than ever before; thus, opening up the possibility of a "new regime"
in constitutional law. The author views this potential new regime as
the offspring of the philosophy of "judicial activism." Accordingly
he closes section IV with a lengthy description of this "conatemporary
13
school of thought" and its "plea" for "aggressive judicial review."
In the concluding sub-book, part V, Professor Hyneman considers
the desirability of judicial activism as compared to a judicial process
which leaves significant policy making to the political process. Professor Hyneman notes that the latter alternative has the advantage
of being more democratic and more efficient. Legislatures not only
are more responsive to the people, but, because of their ability to
move on a step by step basis, to back up when they have gone too far,
and to limit new rulings to a prospective application, they are also a
more effective body for the institution of social reform. Professor Hyneman notes that some would prefer. bold judicial action precisely because the Court is not completely res-p-onsive to the popular will and
therefore better suited to limit majority excesses. Although he does not
flatly reject this position, Professor Hyneman's negative reaction is
clearly indicated by his description of its proponents as painting a
"picture of the Supreme Court as a wise father, admonishing his children to a higher morality by reading appropriate verses from the
Scripture." 14 Professor Hyneman has difficulty with the 'argument
which justifies bold judicial action-'on the ground that -the inaction
of the political branches has left the judiciary -as the only body able
12. Id. at 198-99,
13. Id. at 217.
14. Id. at 245.
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to make secure the democratic process. The author is somewhat
skeptical of a court's ability to determine when legislative inaction
truly signifies a failure of the political process. Moreover, while he
questions any group's ability to fix the outer limits of the democratic
process as they apply to our institutions,15 he feels that the legislative
judgment in this area is at least equal to that of the judiciary.
Although Professor Hyneman professes to do no more than state
the arguments on both sides, the concluding sections of The Supreme
Court on Trial make it obvious that he finds the arguments in favor
of judicial self-restraint stronger than those in favor of judicial activism. This book review is hardly the proper vehicle for a profitable
discussion of the merits of this conclusion, or, for that matter, even
for a discussion of the author's basic assumption that the common
classifications of "judicial self-restraint" and "judicial activism" accurately reflect a true dichotomy in basic judicial philosophy rather
than just a difference in the degree to which particular judges hold
sacred certain constitutional rights. 16 What can be considered in the
limited space available is this: accepting the author's assumptions
and his predilections, has he made the most convincing presentation
of his point of view that can be made, or, of more importance to the
potential reader, has he made the most convincing presentation that
has been made to date. On both counts, I feel the answer is clearly
"no." Though The Supreme Court on Trial has several strong features,
it contains too many major defects to be recommended as a primary
source-book for the lawyer who is interested in exploring the basic
issues raised by the current debate over the proper role of judicial
review.
One such defect is the author's lack of discrimination in his choice
of arguments. Frequently, he detracts from strong arguments by
giving equal (and sometimes even greater) emphasis to weaker arguments, several of which are so attenuated that it is doubtful whether
they should have been mentioned at all. This quality is strikingly
illustrated in the arguments advanced to support the author's conclusion that the critics of the Court have a reasonable basis for
suspecting that the establishment of judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison constituted a usurpation of power not granted to the judiciary.
In analyzing the Marbury case Professor Hyneman concentrates primarily on the question, also stressed by Chief Justice Marshall,
15. Id. at 268.
16. See, e.g., Kadish, A Note on Judicial Activism, 6 UTAH L. REv. 467 (1959);
MeWhinney, The Great Debate: Activism and Self-Restraint and Current Dilemmas in
judicial Policy Making, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 775 (1958); Rodell, Judicial Activists, Judicial Self-deniers, Judicial Review and The First Amendment-or, How to hide the
melody of what you mean behind the words of what you say, 47 GEo. L.J. 374 (1959).
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whether the Constitution was meant to be "paramount" law (i.e., prevailing over contrary legislative acts). The author concludes that opponents of judicial review may "reasonably" take comfort from the
fact that Marshall, in reaching an affirmative answer, "offered an
appeal to generalized experience' as his initial support and turned
only secondarily to the language of the Constitution itself.'7 Surely
the concept of what constitutes "reasonable" support for a position
is strained to the limit when the order of a judge's argumentation in
an opinion is given such significance. It is hard to understand why,
instead of emphasizing this point, indeed, instead of stressing so heavily
the question of whether the Constitution was intended to be paramount law, Professor Hyneman did not concentrate on the point generally recognized to be the weakest link in the argument for judicial
review'-Marshall's premise that, accepting the Constitution as paramount law, the Court's interpretation of that law should be binding
upon co-equal branches of the government.19
Another significant defect in The Supreme Court on Trial is that
too frequently it contains the very flaw which the author complains
of in the work of others, namely that it is "long on argument and
short on evidence."20 Of course, many of the conclusions in a book
of this type are not capable of proof, but too frequently Professor
Hyneman has either failed to offer any evidence, or has offered dramatically insufficient evidence to support conclusions which must be
supported by something more than logic.21 For example, it is Pro17. HYNEMN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 97, 124. Professor Hyneman's analysis
throughout this section goes only to the question of whether anyone could reasonably
doubt the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review and not to the question of
whether the case for judicial review might not still be more convincing than the case
against it. Id. at 93, 113-14. 117-26. Compare BLAms, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1-27.
18. See, e.g., BicKEL, op. cit. supra nce 3, Pt 2-14; BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 3, at
13-16, 26-27; HAND, THE BiIL oF BIGHTs 7-10, 27-30 (1058).
19. Professor Hyneman does recognize this problem at one point, HYNEmAN, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 120, although he does not discuss the possibility of allowing each
branch of the federal government to judge the constitutionality of its own actions.
Some commentators have found support for such a system of "concurrent review" 'in
the writings of Thomas Jefferson. See Krislov, Jefferson and Judicial Review: Refereeing Cohn, Commager and Mendleson, 9 J. Pun. L. 374 (1960); Mendleson, Jefferson
on judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Krisloo, 10 J. Plt. L. 113 (1961); Mendleson,
Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 327
(1962). See also Hand, op. cit. supranote 18, at 3-4.
20. HYNEmAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 244.
21. It should be acknowledged that in at least a few instances the absence of documentation is most understandable. For example, in discussing the Court's unanimity
in the school segregation cases, the author cites a "widespread conviction -among lawyers and other close "observers of the Court that the Supreme Court judges were far
less in agreement than [Chief Justice] Warren's [opinions] would indicate." Id. at 211.
Professor Hyneman has been sharply criticized by one reviewer for' his- failure to cite
"which lawyers and which other close observers" hold this conviction. The absence ,of
such references, -in 'that xeviewer's opinion, reduces Professor -Hyneman's statement
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fessor Hyneman's view that "throughout our history" much of the
criticism of the Court has stemmed from a "significant social doubt
that power to overrule Acts of Congress was conferred on the courts
by the Constitution."' 2 Yet, to support this position he offers little
inore than the statements of fourteen supporters of the Roosevelt
court-packing plan who declared that judicial review of congressional
legislation constituted a usurpation of power. Certainly, such a limited
number of statements, coming within a single period of time, can
haidly substantiate a general conclusion as to the nature of the criticism against the Court from the days of Marbury v. Madison to the
present. Another example of the author's apparent lack of interest
in furnishing evidentiary support for his conclusions is found in his
citation of only a single "illustrative" article to document a rather
dubious statement that "the leading law reviews today" are "dominat[ed]" by the view that "the Supreme Court is chief custodian of
the nation's conscience and it must be supreme in saying what that
conscience requires." 23 In a few instances, moreover, Professor Hyneman has not provided the reader with even a single citation to support his conclusions.2 4 Thus, he offers no support for his statement
to "mere . . . scuttlebut." Fellman, Book Review, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449 (1963).
It should be noted, however, that this very bit of "scuttlebut" has been advanced on
the basis of "information that has filtered out [of the Court]" by one of the closest and
most careful observers of the Court. See Lewis, New Look at the Chief Justice, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 9. Moreover, while the sources of such "scuttlebut" are not identified by Professor Hyneman-possibly because it was felt unnecessary since all they had to offer for publication was their own speculations-the arguments which'support their conjecture are clearly stated and it is primarily on these
arguments, not the authority of others, that the author relies.
22. HYNEm AN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 92. See also id. at 123. But see Barron,
Decision Without Power-The Dilemma of the Supreme Court, 40 NonTH DAKOTA L.
REv. 57, 60 (1964) ("presently . . . [the Court's] power of judicial review is rarely
questioned"); Kurland, Book Review, 28 U. Cm. L. Rv. 188 (1960) ("the argument
.. . that the court has improperly usurped the power of judicial review is no longer
urged by any except those mired in the deep South.")
23. HYNvmA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 196. The article cited, Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960), is
hardly typical of the current literature as indicated by the articles referred to in note 3
supra. See also Golding, PrincipledDecision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLm.
L. Ruv. 35, 36 n.6 (1963).
24.. This diiregard for documentation has carried over to the author's description of
the conclusions reached by others. See, e.g., HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 100, 102,
165, where the author describes the position taken by "lawyers of considerable reknown," "students of American History," and "some writers on constitutional law" but
fails to give any references to the authors whose work he is describing. This shortcoming is overcome in large measure by the bibliographic notes in the appendix to the
book. In fact, to the general reader, the bibliographic notes are probably of much
greater value than would be the documentation of the author's general statements.
There are several instances, however, in which the author's descriptions of the views
attributedcIto others are subject to question, and, at least here, citations should have
been',furished. E.g., id. at 165, where it is stated that "some writers on constitutiongl law have stretched these facts [of the Jones & Laughlin case] into a con-.

HeinOnline -- 18 Vand. L. Rev. 354 1964-1965

BOOK REVIEWS
that "there are many... opinions [of the Supreme Court] in which
fear of future enactments is offered as a main reason for holding the
present enactment invalid."25 This is hardly a matter so obvious to
any student of constitutional law that no citations are needed. In
fact, I am somewhat puzzled as to what cases Professor Hyneman
had in mind when he made his statement.
Although Professor Hyneman's disregard of the need for evidentiary
support of his conclusions is often disconcerting, probably the most
serious defect in his book is a somewhat related tendency to oversimplify, usually by overgeneralizing. In his description of judicial
activism, for example, Professor Hyneman attempts at times to convert the position of a single author into a basic premise of what he
considers to be a whole school of jurisprudence. Thus, he states that
it is a good guess that virtually all students of constitutional law who
think of themselves as judicial activists share the view that "the failure by the State to bar discrimination [by private citizens, organizations, and business firms] is state action denying the equal protection
of the laws."2 It seems very unlikely, however, that more than a
handful of those described as judicial activists would support this
approach to the state action problem.27 In fact, a leading member of
what Professor Hyneman would call the "activist" wing of the Court
has clearly rejected this viewpoint,2 8 and the author cited as the
source of this position only advanced it as one of several possible
approaches to the state action issue.P Professor Hyneman's tendency
to oversimplify is also illustrated by his description of various Court
decisions in the 1930's. For example, in describing the Court's "turnabout' during that period, the author places his emphasis upon the
impact of the Roosevelt court-packing plan and makes no mention
of those factors which have led some commentators to conclude that
the later decisions upholding New Deal Legislation would have been
made even if the Roosevelt plan had never been announced. 30 Similarly, Professor Hyneman characterizes the Iones & Laughlin "subclusion that the Supreme Court will never again hold a national statute invalid on the
ground that it is not necessary and proper to an enumerated power or encroaches on a
power reserved to the states."
25. Id. at 208.
26. Id. at 219 quoting in part from Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAN . L. REv. 555, 569 (1951).
27. Certainly the general literature on the state action problem, both by so-called
"activists" and "passivists," does not reveal much support for this view. See, e.g., the
various articles. cited in Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. Cr.
REv. 101, 115 n.41, 116 n.42, 129 n.73, 134 n.80.
28. See the opinion of Justice Black in Bell v. Maryland, 375 U.S. 918 (1964).
29. See Hyman, supranote 7, at 569-70.
30. See MeWhinney, supra note 16; Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 311 (1955).
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stantial relationship" test 3' for determining the scope of the commerce
power as providing the Supreme Court justices with "a greater invitation to enthrone their own judgments ... than they can find in earlier

opinions."3 He does not, however, acknowledge that substantial
variation in 33viewpoint had also existed under the "standards" of those
older cases.
Despite the defects mentioned above, Professor Hyneman's book
may still have a significant value, if not to the lawyer, at least to the
person who has no previous background in the study of constitutional
law.3 4 Viewed solely as an attempt to explore the current debate over
the role of the Court, to trace its history, and to present the arguments on both sides (with the author's own conclusions clearly indicated) in a fashion understandable to one "new to the study of constitutional law," 35 The Supreme Court on Trial has many favorable
aspects. While it contains little that is new, the book does cover all
the major points brought out by others, and it does so in an interesting manner which is often an improvement over the original presentation. It also presents clearly and in detail all of the background material, particularly the historical material, which a reader must have in
order to appreciate the basic issues being debated. Finally, although
the book does contain some ambiguities, the author generally avoids
the very general, very ambiguous discussions so frequently found in
this field.36 His discussion of judicial activism, for example, though
lacking in other regards, does go beyond a broad, vacuous description
and attempts to relate this philosophy to various substantive constitutional doctrines. Of course, even as a book aimed at the general reader,
The Supreme Court on Trial still has several drawbacks. There is, for
31. NLRB; v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937): "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot
be denied the power to exercise that control."

32.

HYNEmAx,

op. cit. supra note 7, at 165.

33. See, e.g., The opinion of the Court and the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278, 317 (1936). It should be noted that
there. were dissents not only when the "older cases" invalidated congressional legislation but also when they upheld legislation as within the commerce power. See, e.g.,
Chicago, Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 (1923); Houston, East & West Ry.
v.. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914).
34. Professor Hyneman never makes clear the exact audience for which this book
was written. Since it is based on the Shambough Lectures in Political Science delivered
at Iowa State University, I assume it is aimed at readers who already have some
familiarity with the constitutional law field. On the other hand, certain statements in
the book might indicate that it is designed primarily for, people who, as the author
puts it come "new to the study of constitutional law." HYNEmAN, Op. cit. supra note 7,
at 171.
35.--Ibids.
u..
36. But see Feilman, supra note 21.
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one, still the problem of overstatement and oversimplification. Nevertheless the overall picture presented by the book is sufficiently accurate to give the lay reader a general appreciation of the dilemma presented by judicial review in a democratic society, and what is lacking
in subtlety of argument and accuracy may be compensated for by the
author's clear and vigorous style of presentation.
JEROLD ISRAEL*

AmEcAN CONSTIUTIONS (1963 ROSENTHAL LECTURES).
By Wilbur G. Katz. Northwestern University Press, 1964. Pp. 114.
$3.50.

RELIGION AND

In these three amazingly comprehensive lectures on contemporary
church-state problems Professor Katz of the University of Wisconsin
Law School 1 centers his discussion on this crucial issue: should the
state be neutral towards religion or should there be a strict separation
between church and state?
Professor Katz, former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School,
and widely known for his many thoughtful and balanced articles on
the "establishment" and "free exercise" clauses of the first amendment,
argues in these carefully chiselled lectures on behalf of a state neutrality towards religion that would not, however, result in an absolute
or strict separation of church and state. Professor Katz analyzes the
twin forces opposed to state neutrality, first, on the part of those who
assert that the state must assist religion and, secondly, on the part of
those who seek to forbid all state action which, however incidentally,
might render some assistance to religion.
One's first reaction to Professor Katz's definition of neutrality is to
associate it with the well-known test advanced by Professor Philip
Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Kurland
in his volume Religion and the Law argued that the two clauses of
the first amendment "should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."2
.Professor Katz appears to accept the Kurland thesis, but not as a
principle without exceptions; the Katz hypothesis is neutrality but
with an understanding that the state should be an institution which
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Professor Katz is also the chairman of the National Commission on Church-State
Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church.
2. KunLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962).
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